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Silence Isn't Golden:
The CFPB's Privilege Rule and the Risk of Failure
under Chevron Step One
I. INTRODUCTION

On December 20, 2012 President Obama signed into law "An
Act To amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act with respect to
information provided to the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection."1
To be clear, December 20, 2012, was the same day that House Speaker
Boehner intended to push through his "Plan B" budget proposalanother salvo in the fiscal cliff budget negotiations. 2 Amidst partisan
politics of the highest order, it is amazing that the lame duck Congress
and the President could pass any legislation. They came together for
this bill.
Although it inserts just three short lines of text into the U.S.
Code, this bill saved major banks and financial institutions from the risk
of serious civil exposure. Industry-wide liability could easily have been
in the billions of dollars. Without this bill, there was a material risk that
all documents provided to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) would lose privileged status. Without this bill, banks and other
regulated entities were at risk of losing their privilege claims.
For attorneys and their clients, privilege is everything., It is a
shield. It is comparative advantage. It is a central reason that clients
hire attorneys. A company can make full disclosure to an attorney. It
can communicate with candor. It can trust that it will receive concrete,
specific advice in return. That does not work with an accountant, a
marketing expert, a financial advisor, or a business consultant.

1.

An Act to Amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act with Respect to Information

Provided to the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Pub. L. No. 112-215, 126 Stat.
1589 (2012) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1828).
2. Jackie Calmes & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Pressing To Bar Tax Rise For Nearly

All,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
22,
2012,
at
A2,
available
at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/22/us/politics/next-move-is-obamas-after-boehners-taxplan-fails.html?_r-0. The vote never took place as Speaker Boehner lost the support of the
Republican base.
3. Discussion with Richard E. Myers II, Assoc. Dean for Student Affairs and George
R. Ward Assoc. Professor of Law, UNC Sch. of Law, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Oct. 23, 2012).
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Attorneys are valuable because communications with them are
privileged.4
Accordingly, attorneys, especially defense attorneys, pay close
attention when attorney-client privilege and work-product protection are
threatened. During the last decade, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
began to note which companies invoked privilege during investigations.
The DOJ considered this factor in its corporate charging decisions and
punished companies that claimed their communications with their
attorneys were privileged.5 Anger within the bar was fevered.6
Although this policy was later reversed, some fear it has merely become
The potentially chilling effect on attorney-client
implicit. 7
8
communication remains.
In August of 2012, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB or Bureau) finalized a rule after notice-and-comment that
purported to protect privilege for documents provided to the CFPB. 9
Beware of regulators bearing gifts. Contrary to common law, the rule
stated that privileged documents given to the Bureau would still be
privileged as against other parties under the selective waiver doctrine. 10
The selective waiver doctrine is not recognized at common law," but
banks and other regulated entities frequently provide privileged
documents to prudential regulators such as the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 12 The banks generally
provide these documents without being compelled in order to maintain
4. While attorneys also add value based on their experience and legal knowledge, that
value would be severely diminished without the protection of privilege.
5. See Liesa L. Richter, Corporate Salvation or Damnation? ProposedNew Federal
Legislation on Selective Waiver, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 129, 139 (2007) (discussing DOJ

corporate charging guidelines).
6. See Richter, supra note 5, at 143.
7. See Comment Letter for CFPB Proposed Rule on Confidential Treatment of
Privileged Information from William. T. (Bill) Robinson III, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to
Monica Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec'y, CFPB (Apr. 12, 2012) [hereinafter ABA
Comment Letter] (on file with the American Bar Association), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2012aprl 3_attorneyclient
privileges l.authcheckdam.pdf.
8. See id.
9. Confidential Treatment of Privileged Information, 77 Fed. Reg. 39,617 (July 5,
2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1070).
10.

See infra Part IV.

11. See infra Part III.
12. See ABA Comment Letter, supra note 7, at 5.
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positive relationships with their regulators. The practice is so pervasive
that the issue of whether these federal regulators can compel production
of privileged materials is unresolved-no bank appears to have an
appetite for litigating the issue.1 3 They provide these privileged
14
documents under the protection of a statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(x).
The CFPB's privilege rule claimed to be the equivalent of this
statute.' 5 However, the privilege rule issued by the CFPB may not have
been valid. This is not because the rule was at odds with common law,
but because it contradicted the intent of Congress. This lame-duck
legislative fix was critical because the CFPB's rule to protect privilege
6
was at risk of being struck down under Chevron step one.'
This note will demonstrate that the CFPB's privilege rule could
have failed under Chevron analysis. Part II will give the basic
framework for attorney-client privilege, work-product protection, and
waiver.' 7 Part III will introduce the selective waiver doctrine.' 8 Next,
part IV will outline the CFPB's privilege rule.' 9 Part V will forecast the
hypothetical judicial treatment of the CFPB's privilege rule under the
Chevron doctrine.2 0 Finally, Part VI will argue that the CFPB's
privilege rule could have been struck down because Congress did not
intend for the CFPB to receive selective waiver protection, and thus the
rule was in jeopardy under Chevron step one.21

13. See ABA Comment Letter, supra note 7, at 5.
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(x)(1) (2006) ("The submission by any person of any information
to any Federal banking agency, State bank supervisor, or foreign banking authority for any
purpose in the course of any supervisory or regulatory process of such agency, supervisor,
or authority shall not be construed as waiving, destroying, or otherwise affecting any
privilege such person may claim with respect to such information under Federal or State law
as to any person or entity other than such agency, supervisor, or authority.").
15. Confidential Treatment of Privileged Information, 77 Fed. Reg. 39,617 (July 5,
2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1070).
16. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Chevron provides for substantial judicial review of an agency's interpretation of its own
empowering statute.
17.

See infra Part II.

18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. See infra Part VI.
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II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, WORK-PRODUCT PROTECTION, AND
WAIVER

A.

Attorney-Client Privilege
The common law privileges have long played a central role in

our justice system. 22 Foundationally, the attorney-client privilege
protects communications between client and counsel.23 This protection
allows clients to speak with candor to their attorney. It enables
attorneys to give precise legal advice.24 Although there are some
exceptions,2 5 the attorney client privilege is jealously guarded.2 6
However, the privilege is often narrowly construed in its application to
prevent abuse and to encourage wider access to information within the
justice system.2 7
B.

Work-Product Doctrine

Offering further protection, the work-product doctrine shields
documents prepared in anticipation of litigation. 28 In the seminal
22. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("The attorney-client
privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the
common law." (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
2290 (McNaughton Revision, 1961))).
23. See id.
24. Id.("Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully
informed by the client.").
25.

1 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT

PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-

PRODUCT DOCTRINE 637 (5th ed. 2007).
26. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 ("[P]rivilege 'is founded upon the necessity, in the interest
and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled
in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure."' (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S.
464, 470 (1888))).
27. United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1441 (4th Cir. 1986) ("We have stated
repeatedly that the attorney-client privilege is to be strictly construed, in order to harmonize
it, to the extent possible, with the truthseeking mission of the legal process.").
28. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)).
While the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine are the most commonly
litigated privileges, there are other important privileges implicated by the issue of waiver.
One relevant example is the bank examiner's privilege. In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d
465, 471 (6th Cir. 1995) ("The primary purpose of the privilege is to preserve candor in
communications between bankers and examiners, which those parties consider essential to
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Supreme Court case on work-product, Hickman v. Taylor, "the Court
rejected 'an attempt, without purported necessity or justification, to
secure written statements, private memoranda and personal
recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the
course of his legal duties.' 29 Without the work-product doctrine,
careful research and preparation would be punished during discovery.3 °
Despite the importance of these privileges, the federal courts treat them
with some disfavor because they necessarily restrict access to
information by the trier of fact, which can be contrary to the interest of
justice. 31 As noted above, it is for this reason that the common law
privileges are narrowly applied.32
C.

Waiver

Another way that the courts limit the scope of privilege is
through broad application of the waiver doctrine.33 Any disclosure of
privileged information to those other than the privileged parties can
34
allow others to seek discovery of the otherwise privileged information.
Often, to the dismay of parties claiming privilege, judges will rule that it
has been waived.35 Waiver can be affected by simple disclosure to a
the effective supervision of banking institutions.").
29. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)).
While many documents are covered by both the attorney-client privilege and the work
product privilege, the latter is meant specifically to protect the integrity of our adversarial
system. "Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its
functions... on wits borrowed from the adversary." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396 (quoting
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
30. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 398 ("An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not
be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the
giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal
profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice
would be poorly served." (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947))).
31. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979) ("Evidentiary privileges in
litigation are not favored, and even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper
circumstances."); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Mem'l Hosp. for
McHenry Cnty. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981).
32. Tedder, 801 F.2d at 1441 ("We have stated repeatedly that the attorney-client
privilege is to be strictly construed, in order to harmonize it, to the extent possible, with the
truthseeking mission of the legal process.").
33. In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[W]e recognize
several ways by which parties may waive the privilege."); see also Hernandez v. Tanninen,
604 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010).
34. In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d at 1126-27.
35. EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 390.
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third party.36 During litigation, judges will also find a waiver if a party

affirmatively relies upon documents claimed to be privileged. 37 "[I]f a
client wishes to preserve the privilege, it must treat the confidentiality
of attorney-client communication like jewels - if not crown jewels. 38
III.

DISCLOSURES TO THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SELECTIVE WAIVER
DOCTRINE

A potential exception to waiver exists where banks or
39
companies produce privileged documents for the government.
Because the government acts in the public interest, disclosure to the
government should benefit the public - this weighs against waiving
privilege. 40 The risk of waiver creates an incentive to withhold
documents from the government. Presumably, this intransigence makes
the government's public work more difficult. 41 The issue courts must
weigh is whether this policy is sufficient to create an exception to
waiver. This exception to privilege waiver has been labeled the
"selective waiver" doctrine.42 If the selective waiver doctrine is
recognized by the bench, litigants would be allowed to selectively waive
the privilege as to specific adverse government parties while
maintaining privilege claims against others. 43
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first federal circuit
court to address the issue of selected waiver, and in Diversified
Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, it upheld the selective waiver doctrine.44

Diversified Industries, a copper wholesaler, allegedly had agents using a
slush fund to bribe purchasing employees at a brass maker named

36.

Id.

37. Id. at 508 ("The privilege, courts say repeatedly, may not be used both as a sword
and as a shield in the same litigation on the same issue.").
38. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that inadvertent
disclosure can waive the privilege).
39. EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 493. See generally CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO
ATTORNEY-CLIENT, WORK-PRODUCT & SELF-EVALUATIVE PRIVILEGES §1:54 (2012)
(providing further review of the selective waiver doctrine).
40. Cf EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 493 (alluding to the rule's good intentions).
41. See Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir.1981).
42. See EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 492 n. 9 (applying the label "selective waiver" rather
than "partial waiver," but declining to identify the concept as a doctrine).
43. Id.at 492-93.
44. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
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Weatherhead.45 Diversified hired a Washington, D.C. law firm to
investigate and report back to the board of directors.46 The firm issued a
report which was discussed at Diversified's board meetings and later
provided to the SEC.47 In subsequent litigation, Weatherhead sought
discovery of the report and the minutes from the board meetings.4 8
Sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit held that the documents were
privileged and disclosure to the SEC did not waive Diversified's
privilege claim in subsequent litigation. 49 The Eighth Circuit later
50
affirmed this holding in United States v. Shyres.
A.

Rejection of the Selective Waiver Doctrine

Every other Circuit Court of Appeals to confront this issue after
Diversified Industries has rejected the selective waiver doctrine. 1
Uniformly, they have found that an exception to the common law of
privilege waiver was not warranted. 2 As recently as 2006, the Tenth
45. Id.at 600.
46. Id.
47. Id.at 599.
48. Id.at 600.
49. Id.at 604.
50. United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647, 657 (8th Cir. 1990) ("We... reject
appellants' contention that the trial court erred in not requiring disclosure of an internal
investigative report prepared by counsel .... The communications contained in this report
were protected by the attorney-client privilege, which [appellee] did not waive by
voluntarily disclosing the report to the Government .. " (citing Diversified, 572 F.2d at
611)). But see In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program Litig., 860 F.2d
844, 846 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Disclosure to an adversary waives the work product protection as
to items actually disclosed, even where disclosure occurs in settlement." (quoting Grumman
Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Metals Corp. of America, 91 F.R.D. 84, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 198 1)));
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 841 F.2d 230, 234 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Voluntary disclosure is
inconsistent with the confidential attorney-client relationship and waives the privilege.").
These cases challenge Diversified. EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 500. However, Shyres
confirms Diversifiedand is more recent still.
51. See In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006); In re
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002)
(collecting cases); United States v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir.
1997); Genentech, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1417 (Fed. Cir.
1997); In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting selective waiver
in this case, but not adopting a bright-line rule); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of
the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619,
623 (4th Cir. 1988); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
52. An early case, Permian Corp. v. United States, rejected the rationale and holding
from Diversified. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the selective waiver doctrine was not
justified because it did not improve the attorney-client relationship. Permian, 665 F.2d at
1221 ("Voluntary cooperation with government investigations may be a laudable activity,
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Circuit considered the issue in the case In re Qwest Communications
Int'l Inc.53 The circuit panel rejected recognition of the selective waiver
doctrine.54
Though minor, there are some differences among the circuits.
The Second Circuit "decline[d] to adopt a per se rule that all voluntary
disclosures to the government waive.., protection., 55 However, in
practice, the Second Circuit has generally rejected selective waiver
claims. 56 The Southern District of New York, a judicial focal point for
banking and securities litigation, has deployed the selective waiver
doctrine on occasion.57 Judges in the district have upheld privilege
claims where a privilege agreement or non-waiver agreement was in
58
place between the disclosing party and the government.
but it is hard to understand how such conduct improves the attorney-client relationship.").
The Permian court also held that the value of encouraging cooperation with government
offices was "laudable," but insufficient to justify the selective waiver doctrine. See id.
Through the 80's, 90's, and 00's the other circuits followed in near lockstep rejecting the
selective waiver doctrine. See In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., 450 F.3d at 1185; In re
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing PracticesLitig., 293 F.3d 289 (collecting cases);
Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681; Genentech, Inc., 122 F.3d at 1417; In re
Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230 (rejecting selective waiver in this case, but not
adopting a bright-line rule); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d 1414; In re Martin
Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d at 623; Permian Corp., 665 F.2d at 1220.
53. In re Qwest Commc'ns, 450 F.3d at 1185.
54. Id.
55. In re Steinhardt Partners,9 F.3d at 236 ("Crafting rules relating to privilege in
matters of governmental investigations must be done on a case-by-case basis.") (citing
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981)).
56. EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 497.
57. See id. at 505 (collecting cases); In re Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 232 F.R.D.
208 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) aff'g 2005 WL 1457666 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2005) (affirming the
opinion order of a magistrate judge that privilege was not waived where a confidentiality
agreement was in place).
58. See EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 505 (collecting cases). Judge Posner has presented a
different analysis of the selective waiver doctrine based on forfeiture, but his opinion has yet
to be widely cited. Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122 (7th Cir. 1997).
But see In re Qwest Commc 'ns, 450 F.3d at 1189; EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 390. Dellwood
recasts the selective disclosure debate in terms of punitive forfeiture rather than deliberate
waiver. Dellwood, 128 F.3d at 1127. The DOJ sought to prevent discovery of tapes from
an ongoing criminal anti-trust investigation. Dellwood was a private civil suit; the DOJ was
not a party. The DOJ claimed that a "law enforcement investigatory privilege" protected
against disclosure. Id. This case has been cited for the proposition that selective waiver
may be acceptable where a privilege agreement was in place, but that is a
mischaracterization. See EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 506. Dellwood actually recognizes that
the true purpose behind the strict rejection of the selective waiver doctrine is to prevent
parties from manipulatively using privilege. Dellwood, 128 F.3d at 1127 ("The reason[] [for
imposing such a harsh sanction], . . . [is] a fear that selective disclosure will be used to
obtain a strategic advantage .... "). Measuring selective disclosure in terms of forfeiture
rather than waiver would achieve the policy goals behind the circuit majority's rejection of
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ConfidentialityAgreements andAttacks on Privilege

Because the selective waiver doctrine has been widely rejected
across the Circuit Courts of Appeals, there is no reliable way to prevent
waiver if privileged documents are shared with the government.5 9 Still,
parties often request confidentiality agreements or protective orders
because it shows the disclosing party's intent to maintain privilege. 60 A
few courts have cited such agreements in rejecting waiver arguments
and they come at little cost. 61 However, generally speaking, attempts to
cooperate with government and maintain privilege have failed.62
"[C]ompanies that have turned over privileged information... to
to provide their civil
federal investigators have been punished by having
" ' 63
information.
sensitive
same
the
with
adversaries
Over the past decade, the selective waiver doctrine and attorneyclient privilege have been hotly contested within the bar. 64 A series of
memoranda from the DOJ regarding charging guidelines for corporate
entities propelled the controversy to new heights 65 - these include the
original Holder Memo 66 and the superseding Thompson Memo. 67 In
these memos, the DOJ announced and reconfirmed that in making
charging decisions it would consider whether corporations waived
privilege claims during investigations. 68 As the DOJ pushed more

the doctrine while allowing for rarer cases where a countervailing policy is present. In
Dellwood, the countervailing policy was prosecutorial discretion. Id.at 1125.
59. EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 493 ("The fond and all but invariably futile hope of the
disclosing party is to be allowed to make such selective waiver without thereby losing the
protection of the privilege in respect to the rest of the world.").
60. Id.
61. Id.at 504.
62. Richter, supra note 5, at 133 (citing Inre Qwest Commc'ns,450 F.3d 1179).
63. Id.
64. Id.at 143 n.52.
65. Id.
66. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att'y Gen., to All Component
Heads and U.S. Att'ys (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo], available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF
(describing the factors considered by the government when deciding whether to bring
criminal charges against a corporation).
67. Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Larry Thompson to Heads of Dep't
Components and U.S. Att'ys (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo], available at
factors
the
(describing
http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/business-organizations.pdf
considered by the government when deciding whether to bring criminal charges against a
corporation).
68. Id.
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companies to waive privilege, the risk of waiver to other parties
increased, and the desirability of using the selective waiver doctrine
increased as well.
"[A]s federal authorities have increasingly
emphasized 'authentic cooperation' by corporate targets ... circuit
courts have gradually lined up to reject waiver protection for those
companies in third-party civil litigation. Companies are increasingly
finding themselves caught between the 'rock' of federal investigation
69
and the 'hard place' of increased civil exposure."
C.

FailedAttempt at Universal Selective Waiver Protection

Efforts to codify the selective waiver doctrine were
unsuccessful. Amidst this atmosphere of government pressure-induced
waiver, the organized bar was vocal in calling for statutory or rule
changes to protect the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine. 70 A new Federal Rule of Evidence, 502, was proposed in 2006
in response to the outcry. 1 It included a specific exception providing
that a "voluntary disclosure does not operate as a waiver if... the
disclosure is made to a federal, state, or local governmental agency
during an investigation by that agency, and is limited to persons
involved in the investigation., 72 The proposed rule was not adopted
73
because the groups lobbying for it reversed course at the last minute.
They felt emboldened and believed they could get even stronger
language passed.7 4 They were wrong.
D.

Statutory Selective Waiver Protectionfor Banks

In contrast, banks and other regulated financial entities had
more success gaining selective waiver protection. In 2006, Congress
passed an omnibus financial regulation reform bill, the Financial
69.

Richter, supra note 5, at 155.

70. EPsTEIN, supra note 25, at 493.
71. Richter, supra note 5, at 155.
72. EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 493.
73. Richter, supra note 5, at 133 ("On the verge of obtaining the [selective waiver]
protection they have long sought through this proposed evidence rule, corporate counsel did
a surprising about-face and formed a broad coalition opposing the proposal. This coalition
claims that selective waiver would perpetuate and endorse a 'culture of waiver' that has
evolved in connection with federal investigations.") (footnote omitted).
74. Id.
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Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006. 75 Banks and thrifts lobbied for
Section 607, titled "Nonwaiver of Privileges. 7 6 Codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1828(x), this provision allowed banks and regulated entities to provide
otherwise privileged documents to "[f]ederal banking agencies" without
waiving privilege claims against third-party litigants in subsequent
actions.77 The FRB and the OCC both had representatives testify before
Congress in support of this statute.7 8
E.

Statutory Selective Waiver ProtectionNot Extended to the
CFPB
The selective waiver statute only applies to federal banking

agencies. The federal banking agencies are enumerated by statute for
the purpose of applying section 1828(x) and other provisions of Chapter
12 of the U.S. Code.79 In 2006, when the reform bill was passed, the list
of federal banking agencies included the OCC, the FRB, the FDIC, and
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). 80 This section was later revised
by the Dodd-Frank Act to strike the OTS from the list. 81 If the DoddFrank Act had added the CFPB to the statutory list of federal banking

agencies, then the "nonwaiver" protection afforded to regulated entities
under section 1828(x) would also have been extended to entities
regulated by the CFPB and the privilege rule would have been
unnecessary. 82 However, including the CFPB as a federal banking
agency would also give the Bureau many other powers previously

75. Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, 120 Stat.
1966.
76. Audrey Strauss, Selective Waiver for the Banking Industry, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 1, 2007,
at
available
http://friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/CDOFD9CFC 11 1EB73E66F47FC6752E7E4.pdf
77. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(x) (2006). A mirror provision was codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1785(j) for the provision of documents to the National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA). 12 U.S.C. § 17850) (2006).
78. Consideration of Regulatory Relief Proposals: Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 8, 11 (2006) (statements of Donald Kohn,
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and Julie Williams, First
Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
79. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(z) (2006).
80. Id.
81. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 363, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1550 (2010).
82. See ABA Comment Letter, supra note 7, at 5-6.
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reserved for the prudential regulators. 83 Dodd-Frank did not add the
CFPB to the list of federal banking agencies to which the section
1828(x) protections were extended.
Separate from section 1828(x), there are provisions in the DoddFrank Act entitled "Retention of Privilege," but they do not cover the
CFPB.84 They provide protection similar to section 1828(x) for
disclosures made to the Financial Stability Oversight Committee
(FSOC), the Office of Financial Research, and the Federal Insurance
Office, but not the CFPB.8 5 These provisions provide that the
"submission of any nonpublicly available data or information [to each
respective office] shall not constitute a waiver of, or otherwise affect,
any privilege arising under Federal or State law (including the rules of
any Federal or State court) to which the data or information is otherwise
subject."86

83. See e.g. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (2006) (granting the power to remove and prohibit
officers from the banking industry); 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (2006) (granting the power to
assess civil money penalties).
84. 12 U.S.C. § 5322(d)(5)(B) (Supp. IV 2010) (covering the Financial Stability
Oversight Council and the Office of Financial Research); 31 U.S.C. § 313(e)(5)(A) (Supp.
IV 2010) (covering the Office of National Insurance (now Federal Insurance Office)). The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act created two new independent
agencies: Financial Stability Oversight Committee, 12 U.S.C § 5321 (Supp. IV 2010);
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (Supp. IV 2010). It also
created nine new subordinate offices: (1) Office of Financial Research in the Department of
the Treasury, 12 U.S.C. § 5342 (Supp. IV 2010); (2) Office of National Insurance (Federal
Insurance Office) in the Department of the Treasury, 31 U.S.C. § 313 (Supp. IV 2010); (3)
Office of Credit Ratings in the Securities and Exchange Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 78o7(p)(1) (Supp. IV 2010); (4) Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight, DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 989E, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376, 1946, reprintedin 5 U.S.C. app § 11 (Supp. IV 2010); (5) Office of Fair Lending
and Equal Opportunity in the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 12 U.S.C. § 5493
(Supp. IV 2010); (6) Office of Financial Education in the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection, 12 U.S.C. § 5493 (Supp. IV 2010); (7) Office of Service Member Affairs in the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 12 U.S.C. § 5493 (Supp. IV 2010); (8) Office of
Financial Protection for Older Americans in the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,
12 U.S.C. § 5493 (Supp. IV 2010); (9) Office of Housing Counseling in the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 42 U.S.C. § 3533 (Supp. IV 2010). Dodd-Frank also
closed one independent agency by merging the OTS with the OCC. 12 U.S.C. § 5401
(Supp. IV 2010).
85. See 12 U.S.C. § 5322(d)(5)(B) (Supp. IV 2010) (covering the Financial Stability
Oversight Council and the Office of Financial Research); 31 U.S.C. § 313(e)(5)(A) (Supp.
IV 2010) (covering the Office of National Insurance (now Federal Insurance Office)).
86. 12 U.S.C. § 5322(d)(5)(B) (Supp. IV 2010) (covering the Financial Stability
Oversight Council and the Office of Financial Research); 31 U.S.C. § 313(e)(5)(A) (Supp.
IV 2010) (covering the Office of National Insurance (now Federal Insurance Office)).
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The Dodd-FrankAct and the Creation of the CFPB
1. Creation of the CFPB

Congress created the CFPB in response to widespread abuse in
the consumer finance marketplace.87
The Bureau has drawn an
aggressive reputation for some of its early civil fines. 88 The CFPB's
first director, Richard Cordray, was selected by President Obama amidst
controversy over the constitutionality of the recess appointment. 89 "The
[creation of the Bureau] significantly alter[ed] the consumer financial
protection landscape by consolidating rulemaking authority and, to a
lesser extent, supervisory and enforcement authority in one regulatorthe CFPB." 90
2. The CFPB's Regulatory Jurisdiction
The Bureau's primary jurisdiction covers two types of entities
subject to federal consumer finance laws: depository and nondepository institutions. 91 Depository institutions, including banks,
thrifts, and credit unions, are further divided by a total assets benchmark
of $10 billion or more.92 The CFPB is charged with the supervision and
enforcement of compliance with the federal consumer finance laws. 93 It

87.

12 U.S.C. § 5491 (Supp. IV 2010).

The CFPB is referred to as the Bureau of

Consumer Financial Protection in the Dodd-Frank Act.
88. See Carter Dougherty and Jesse Hamilton, American Express to Pay $112.5 Million
over

Credit-Card Add-ons,

BLOOMBERG

NEWS,

Oct.

1,

2012,

available at

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-0 1/american-express-to-pay- 112-5-million-overcredit-card-a.html; Carter Dougherty and Dakin Campbell, Capital One to Pay $210 Million
in

First CFPB Enforcement, BLOOMBERG

NEWS,

July

18,

2012,

available at

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-18/capital-one-to-pay-210-million-in-first-cfpbenforcement-case.html; Carter Dougherty, Discover to Keep Selling CardAdd-ons in Wake
of U.S. Penalties, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
Sep. 24, 2012, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-24/discover-to-keep-selling-card-add-ons-inwake-of-u-s-penalties.html.
89. Hans Nichols and Laura Litvan, Obama Installs Richard Cordray as Consumer
Head in Defiance of Republicans, BLOOMBERG NEWS,

Jan. 4,

2012, available at

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-04/obama-said-to-name-cordray-as-consumerbureau-chief-in-recess-appointment.html.
90. DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42572,
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (CFPB): A LEGAL ANALYSIS 9 (2012).

91. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5514, 5515 (Supp. IV 2010).
92. Id. at § 5515.
93. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5515, 5516 (Supp. IV 2010).
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has primary jurisdiction over institutions with more than $10 billion in
assets, but only limited jurisdiction over institutions below that
threshold. 94 The Bureau has identical supervisory and enforcement
powers over non-depository entities such as payday lenders, mortgage
loan originators and servicers, private education loan providers, and
private debt collectors, as well as any entity apprehended via its own
consumer complaint system.95 Major federal consumer finance laws
overseen by the Bureau include the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA), and the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA).9 6
3. The CFPB's Regulatory Powers
Relevant to the issue of privilege and waiver, the CFPB has
been entrusted with strong oversight powers equivalent to that of the
prudential regulators (OCC, FRB, FDIC, and the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA)).97 For example, an OCC examiner has the
"power to make a thorough examination of all the affairs of the bank...
. [H]e shall have power to administer oaths and to examine any of the
officers and agents thereof under oath." 98 The Supreme Court recently
discussed the genesis and the scope of supervisory powers and found
them very broad, analogizing them to a king's right to visit and inspect
any corporation.99 While banks and other depositories are accustomed
to this level of scrutiny, the CFPB has the power to deploy the same
oversight upon non-depository businesses.10 0 These businesses have not
dealt with frequent regulatory examination by a federal agency before.
Critical to the issue of privilege and waiver, the Dodd-Frank Act
extended to the CFPB comparable document access enjoyed by the
prudential regulators, but did not extend the selective waiver protection
of 12 U.S.C. § 1828(x).

94. Id. at § 5515.
95. Id. at § 5514.
96. Carpenter, supra note 90, at 3, 24 (listing acts).

97.

12 U.S.C. §§ 5514, 5515, 5581 (Supp. IV 2010).

98. Id. at § 481 (Supp. IV 2010).
99. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009).
100. 12 U.S.C. § 5514.
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4. Important Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
The Dodd-Frank Act also empowered the CFPB to engage in
rulemaking. 10 1 This general grant of rulemaking authority is important
because it signals to courts a higher level of congressional delegation of
authority, which entails greater deference. 10 2 Dodd-Frank also provided
the CFPB with a specific grant of rulemaking authority regarding
confidentiality: "The Bureau shall prescribe rules regarding the
confidential treatment of information obtained from persons in
connection with the exercise of its authorities under Federal consumer
10 3
financial law."'
IV.

THE CFPB's PRIVILEGE RULE

The CFPB issued its privilege rule in order to ease industry
concerns of waiver. The Dodd-Frank Act empowered the CFPB to
access proprietary and privileged documents, but did not extend

selective waiver protection. 10 4 When Congress was considering the
selective waiver statute in 2006, the OCC and FRB favored it because it
would smooth relations with depository institutions.105 The rejection of
the selective waiver doctrine in the Circuit Courts is no boon to
regulators because regulated parties have a reason to be less
forthcoming: the risk of civil exposure.' 0 6 This benefit accrues to the
plaintiff's bar.' 0 7 This risk was noted by the defense bar and entities

falling within the CFPB's newly minted jurisdiction.I°8
101. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2010). ("The Director may prescribe rules and
issue orders and guidance, as may be necessary or appropriate to enable the Bureau to
administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws,
and to prevent the evasions thereof.").
102.

See infra Part IV.B. Sde also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMIN. LAW TREATISE § 6.2

at 408 (5th ed. 2010) ("An agency has the power to issue binding legislative rules only if
and to the extent Congress has granted it the power to do so.").
103. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(6)(A) (Supp. IV 2010).
104. See supra Part IlI.E.
105. Considerationof Regulatory Relief Proposals:Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (comments from Donald Kohn
(FRB) and Julie Williams (OCC)).
106. See Richter, supra note 5, at 133.
107. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289
(6th Cir. 2002); In re Qwest Commc'n Int'l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10Oth Cir. 2006).
108. See Kevin L. Petrasic and Michael A. Hertzberg, CFPB Makes the Case for
Supervisory

Examination

Privilege,

PAUL

HASTINGS

LLP

(Jan.

19,

2012),
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Privilege Protectionand CFPBBulletin 12-01

Originally, the CFPB did not think a notice-and-comment rule
was necessary to protect privilege claims. In response to industry
concerns, the CFPB issued Bulletin 12-01 on January 4, 2012.109 In the
bulletin, the Bureau explained why its statutory grant of jurisdiction
included the power to compel production of documents regardless of
privilege claims. " Further, the CFPB determined that the provision of
privileged documents to its officers by regulated entities did not waive
privilege claims."'1
The bulletin provided dual rationales. First,
because supervisory requests demand mandatory compliance, the
provision of documents is not voluntary and therefore there is no
waiver. 112 Second, the bulletin explains that the selective waiver
statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(x), does apply to the CFPB via a "transfer of
powers" statute in Dodd-Frank. 1 3 Perhaps, because these rationales
were found not compelling, the CFPB elected to issue a new rule
protecting privilege via notice and comment rulemaking.
B.

Notice and Comment Rule ProtectingPrivilege

The Bureau issued a proposed rule in March 2012 for notice and
'' 14
comment titled "Privileges not affected by disclosures to the CFPB."
The rule provided that "[t]he submission by any person of any
information to the CFPB for any purpose in the course of any
supervisory or regulatory process of the CFPB shall not be construed as
waiving, destroying, or otherwise affecting any privilege such person

http://www.paulhastings.com/publicationdetail.aspx?publicationld=2090.
109. CONSUMER FrN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. 12-01, THE BUREAU'S SUPERVISION
AUTHORITY AND TREATMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL SUPERVISORY INFORMATION (2012),

availableat http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/01/GCbulletin 12-01 .pdf.
110. See id.at 1-2.
111. See id. at 2 ("[T]he provision of information to the Bureau pursuant to a
supervisory request would not waive any privilege that may attach to such information.").
112. See id. at 2 ("[B]ecause entities must comply with the bureau's supervisory
requests for information, the provision of privileged information to the Bureau would not be
considered voluntary and would thus not waive any privilege that attached to such
information.") (citing Boston Auction Co. v. Western Farm Credit Bank, 925 F. Supp. 1478
(D. Hawaii 1996)).
113. See id. at 2-3; 12 U.S.C. § 5581 (Supp. IV 2010).
114. Confidential Treatment of Privileged Information, 77 Fed. Reg. 15,286, 15,287
(proposed March 15, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1070).
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may claim with respect to such information under Federal or State law
as to any person or entity other than the CFPB." 1 5 The Bureau's
explanation stated that the rule was intended to parallel the selective
16
waiver statute covering the prudential regulators in section 1828(x).
It is important to note an agency's statutory justification when it
issues a rule because a reviewing court can only consider the authority
originally cited by an agency."1 7 They will not entertain new arguments
first provided in court.11 8 As statutory justification for its authority to
issue this rule, the Bureau cited its general rulemaking authority, 19 and
its specific rulemaking authority over the confidential treatment of
0
information obtained during the course of its work.12
C.

Public Comments and the FinalRule

Most comment letters submitted were from parties subject to
CFPB jurisdiction and industry lobbying organizations.' 2' Generally,
these letters supported the Bureau's policy goal to gain selective waiver
protection, but they questioned the rule's legal viability.' 22 They urged
123
congressional action to protect privileged documents by statute.
By far, the most detailed and challenging comment letter came

115. Id. at 15,291.
116. Id. at 15,287 ("This rule is substantively identical to the statutory provisions that
apply to the submission of privileged information to the prudential regulators, [s]tate bank
and credit union supervisors, and foreign banking authorities in the course of their
supervisory or regulatory processes.") (footnote omitted).
117. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) ("We merely hold that an
administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in
exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.").
118. See id
119. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2010).
120. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(6)(A) (Supp. IV 2010).
121. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Mary Mitchell Dunn, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Credit
Union Nat'l Ass'n (CUNA), to Monica Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec'y, CFPB (Apr. 16,
2012) [hereinafter CUNA Comment Letter]; Comment Letter from Stephen O'Connor,
Senior Vice President, Mortg. Bankers Ass'n (MBA), to Monica Jackson, Office of the
Exec. Sec'y, CFPB (Apr. 16, 2012) [hereinafter MBA Comment Letter]; Comment Letter
from Carl V. Howard, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Citigroup Inc., to Monica Jackson, Office of
the Exec. Sec'y, CFPB (Apr. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Citigroup Comment Letter].
122. See CUNA Comment Letter, supra note 121; MBA Comment Letter, supra note
121; Citigroup Comment Letter, supra note 121.
123. See CUNA Comment Letter, supra note 121; MBA Comment Letter, supra note
121; Citigroup Comment Letter, supra note 121.
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from the American Bar Association (ABA). 124 The ABA outlined its
longstanding opposition to government policies that pressure
individuals and companies to waive privilege claims. 125 This included
126
the DOJ's decision to replace the Holder and Thompson memoranda
with purportedly less aggressive policies that do not pressure the targets
27
of investigations to waive privilege claims. 1
Although not specifically part of the Bureau's proposed rule, the
ABA rebutted the CFPB Bulletin 12-01 claim that the Bureau has the
power to compel production of privileged documents.' 28 The ABA
argued that the prudential regulators lack this power and that, at best,
the issue is unsettled. 129 It then leveraged this conclusion to criticize the
Bureau's privilege rule. The ABA argued that courts will find
submissions to the CFPB to be non-mandatory and thus constitute a
30
waiver of privilege. 1
The credibility of the ABA's argument is uncertain because it
would be difficult to prove that the prudential regulators cannot compel
the production of privileged materials. The prudential regulators have
long claimed the power to access privileged documents as part of their
supervisory powers. 31 This issue has not been clearly settled in the
courts and it is unlikely to be settled in the near future - the parties are
not interested in litigating the issue. However, in Cuomo v. Clearing
House Ass', L.L.C.,13 2 the Supreme Court suggests the supervisory
power entrusted to the prudential regulators is very broad.'33 A court
that upholds the power of the prudential regulators to seek privileged
documents would have a very difficult time ruling that the same power

124.
125.
126.
127.

See ABA Comment Letter, supra note 7.
Id. at 2.
See supra Part II.B.
ABA Comment Letter, supra note 7, at 2.

128.

Id. at 4-6.

129.

Id.

130.

Id. at 8-9.

131. OCC, OFFICE OF DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL, INTERPRETIvE LETTER, 1991 WL 338409
(Dec. 3, 1991); Coordination and Information Sharing Among Financial Institution
Regulators:Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Gen. Oversight and Investigations and on
Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Services, 102nd Cong. (1991)
(statement of Julie Williams, First Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief Counsel, OCC);
OCC's Examiner's Handbook, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY (Feb. 2000), available at
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/litgtn.pdf.
132. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 557 U.S. 519 (2009).
133. Id.
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Act's "transfer of
does not extend to the CFPB; the Dodd-Frank
134
point.
this
on
explicit
powers" provision is
Furthermore, the ABA's argument might have been litigiously
imprudent because, as outlined below, the CFPB's rule may fail under
Chevron step one. Despite criticism from industry and the ABA, the
CFPB's final rule was unaltered and became effective August 6,
2012.135 The rule has not allayed the concerns of industry or the
136
defense bar.

V.

ANTICIPATED JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE CFPB's PRIVILEGE RULE

The exact circumstances under which the CFPB's privilege rule
might have been challenged are not certain, but there are two
predictable scenarios. First, an entity regulated by the CFPB may bring
suit after a Bureau request for privileged information. Second, a civil
plaintiff could challenge the rule in a discovery dispute attempting to

compel an entity regulated by the CFPB to produce privileged materials
previously provided to the Bureau. The justiciability issues for each
scenario are discussed below.
A.

JusticiabilityIssues and Legal Scenarios Challengingthe Rule
First, if the CFPB requested privileged documents from a

regulated entity, such as a very large bank or a payday lender, that party
could bring suit challenging the privilege rule. 137 However, many
companies would be wary about suing the CFPB out of concern of
souring an important regulatory relationship.' 38

Even though the

134. 12 U.S.C. § 5581 (Supp. IV 2010).
135. Confidential Treatment of Privileged Information, 77 Fed. Reg. 39,617 (July 5,
2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1070).
136. Kate Berry, CFPB's Rule on Attorney-Client Privilege Raises Concerns, A.M.
7
BANKER, Oct. 12, 2012, availableat http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/1 7_197/cfpbrule-on-attorney-client-privilege-raises-concerns- 1053420-1.html.
137. See Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Prior to Abbott Laboratories,
agency rules could only be challenged in the context of concrete cases under the Const. Art.
However, the Abbott Laboratories Court
III standard for cases and controversies.
recognized that regulated entities faced a great deal of risk in determining whether to
comply with arguably invalid rules. Furthermore, fear of agency enforcement action or
license suspension tended to prevent controversies from coming before the courts. The
Supreme Court ruled that substantive review could be had pre-enforcement, so long as
minimal standards ofjusticiability were met.
138. Arguably, it is counter-productive for a bank to challenge this rule because the rule
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CFPB's privilege rule is now final, suing before the CFPB requests any
privileged documents would lead to dismissal for non-justiciability.13 9
Alternatively, the rule could be challenged in a discovery
dispute without the CFPB as a party. A regulated entity could comply
with a CFPB request for privileged documents. Later, if the same entity
is sued, the civil plaintiff could seek production of those privileged
documents and argue that privilege claims were waived when the
documents were provided to the CFPB. The regulated entity could
point to the CFPB's privilege rule to claim privilege was not waived.
The court would be forced to determine whether the privilege rule was
valid.
B.

The Chevron Doctrine

Agency rules will be found invalid if they contradict a statutory
provision. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) § 706(2)(A),
"[t]he reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be... not in accordance with
law."'140 This is the statutory fountainhead of the Chevron doctrine. 14 1
Agencies must act within the statutory bounds provided by
Congress.142 The APA provides that where an agency action, including
a notice-and-comment rule, strays outside statutory bounds, it must be
ruled "not in accordance with law" and overturned. 143 Applying this
section of the APA, the Chevron Doctrine allows for substantive review
of agency actions, but affords great deference to agency decisions.
From the original Chevron case, the doctrine provides:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the
statute which it administers, it is confronted with two
provides the bank with greater protection. However, uncertainty over the rule's validity
could materially alter how a regulated entity deals with the CFPB. If the rule is invalid,
banks will be more careful about what documents they provide to the CFPB and what
documents they provide willingly.
139. See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. 136; Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior,
538 U.S. 803 (2003) (showing the modem application of this principle).
140. Administrative Procedure Act § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (emphasis added).
141. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
142. Id.at 842-843 ("The judiciary ...must reject administrative constructions which
are contrary to clear congressional intent.") (citations omitted).
143. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
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questions.
First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,
the court does not simply impose its own construction
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.144
1. Chevron Step One
"First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue."' 145 In this case, the precise
question is apparent: Did Congress intend for privileged documents
provided to the CFPB to be protected by the selective waiver doctrine?
Determining whether Congress has directly addressed this issue is more
difficult. Reasonable people disagree on how to measure congressional
intent. 146 The Chevron Court directed that courts should use "traditional
tools of statutory construction [to determine whether] Congress had an
intention on the precise question at issue., 14 7 The Court relied on
statutory analysis 148 and legislative history, 149 but ultimately found that
neither method led to a clear view of congressional intent in that case.
Critically, there are divergent views on the Court as to which
traditional tools of statutory construction may be used and how they
144. Chevron, 476 U.S. at 842-843 (footnotes omitted).
145. Id. at 842.
146. See Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 24, 2012, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-andarts/10644 1/scalia-gamer-reading-the-law-textual-originalism.
147. Chevron, 476 U.S. at 842-843.
148. Id. at 861 ("We are not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the
statute will reveal an actual intent of Congress.").
149. Id. at 862 ("Based on our examination of legislative history, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that it is unilluminating.").
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may be deployed to divine congressional intent. 150 The most popular
tools of statutory construction 15 1 are plain meaning,' 52 legislative
history, 1 53 and the canons of construction. 154 Each method has been

savaged twice as many times as it has been lauded. This note eschews
any attempt to adjudicate between the most popular methods of
statutory interpretation.

Strict rules do not necessarily organize all

available sources to best illuminate congressional intent. 155 Instead, this
note makes use of a single, frequently deployed canon of construction to
show that Congress did not intend for the CFPB to have selective
waiver protection.
2. Chevron Step Two

If a court finds that Congress has not directly spoken to the
150. PIERCE, supra note 102, at 237 (noting that "the widely differing way in which the
Justices define and apply 'traditional tools of statutory construction' helps to highlight the
importance of the as yet unresolved debate among the Justices concerning the meaning of
the Chevron test. If reviewing courts are free to use any combination of the 'traditional
tools of statutory construction' they choose in the process of applying Chevron step one,
few if any cases will reach Chevron step two. It is the very indeterminacy of the 'traditional
tools' that gives judges the discretion to make policy decisions through the process of
statutory construction.").
151. See id. at 228 (providing a survey of common methods with diverse examples
where each one is deployed to the exclusion of the other methods).
152. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the CoordinatingFunction of Plain
Meaning, 1990 SuP. CT. REv. 231 (1990).
153. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992).
154. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1949-1950)
(criticizing the flexible diversity of the canons of construction). Pierce also suggests
congressional purpose is a valid doctrine to determine congressional intent. See PIERCE,
supra note 102, at 228 (citing HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1148-1179 (10th ed.
1958) (unpublished book)). This may be incorrect because the D.C. Circuit relied upon
congressional purpose in its decision that was ultimately struck down by the Supreme Court.
See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
overruled by Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
155. The individuals evaluating Chevron arguments over statutory construction are
among the most sophisticated minds in the law. While strict standards of statutory
construction may constrain judges from injecting personal politics, the people scrutinizing
judicial decisions are imminently well prepared to determine whether congressional intent
has been abandoned as a guidepost. This is true regardless of whether strict rules are
obeyed. Cf CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 2 ADMIN L. PRAC. § 5.52 (3rd ed. 2012) ("A soft
approach to the rules of evidence has developed [in administrative law] because the rules of
evidence are designed to protect unsophisticated members of a jury and hence are not
appropriate for hearings in which the trier of fact is sophisticated and usually expert in the
area of the factual controversy.").
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precise issue, the analysis shifts to Chevron's second step. 116 This
merely asks whether the agency's statutory interpretation is
reasonable. 157 It need not be preferable, merely reasonable. 158 Very
few agency rules or adjudications fail at step two.1 59 This note will not
reach Chevron step two analysis because the CFPB's privilege rule
likely fails under step one.
VI. THE CFPB's PRIVILEGE RULE LIKELY FAILS UNDER CHEVRON STEP
ONE

When challenged, the CFPB's privilege rule could fail under
Chevron step one, but the issue is not conclusive. On one hand, the
Bureau was specifically empowered to create rules regarding the
This could be
confidential treatment of information it obtained.
sufficient for the CFPB to prevail. On the other hand, there is also
evidence to suggest that Congress has directly spoken to this precise
issue and did not intend for privileged documents provided to the CFPB
to be protected by the selective waiver doctrine. Congress provided two
selective waiver provisions in Dodd-Frank for new agencies and offices;
it did not provide a selective waiver provision covering the CFPB. 6 °
This could be sufficient to find clear congressional intent.
A.

Confidential Treatment ofInformation

The Bureau maintains that Congress intended for the Bureau to
issue rules to protect confidence. This contention cannot be dismissed.
It cites Congress's statutory directive to "prescribe rules regarding the
confidential treatment of information obtained from persons in
connection with the exercise of its authorities under Federal consumer

156. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
("[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.")
(footnote omitted).
157. Id.("The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it
permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court
would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.").
158. Id.
159. Cf PIERCE, supra note 102, at 228 (discussing the low standard imposed by
Chevron step two).
160. 12 U.S.C.

§ 5322

(Supp. IV 2010); 31 U.S.C.

§

313(e)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 2010).
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financial law." 16 1 The Bureau's rule does support the confidential
treatment of information obtained pursuant to the Bureau's regulatory
authority. A judge performing a Chevron analysis could reasonably
conclude that Congress had rules similar to the CFPB's new rule in
mind when it drafted this provision and Congress specifically intended
for the Bureau to issue these rules. This would validate the privilege
rule under Chevron. However, while impossible to ignore, this
conclusion is not the only reasonable interpretation.
First, the statute is concerned with the "confidential treatment of
information." This is different from "the treatment of confidential
information." This distinction suggests Congress was concerned about
the Bureau's responsible handling of the information it collected. This
concern would not be specific to confidential or privileged information.
It would apply to everything collected by the Bureau. This specific
provision is not about privilege and waiver. It is about ensuring the
Bureau adequately protects the information it collects.
This interpretation is supported by a portion of the legislative
history: a failed amendment from the House of Representatives. In an
amendment offered by Rep. Walter Minnick of Idaho, this statutory
provision was two sentences long rather than just one.' 62 The statute
currently reads: "The Bureau shall prescribe rules regarding the
confidential treatment of information obtained from persons in
connection with the exercise of its authoritiesunder Federal consumer
financial law." 163 The amendment read: "The Council, the Financial
Institutions Examination Council, the [CFPB], and the consumer
protection agencies shall each issue regulations regarding the
confidential treatment of information obtained from persons in
connection with the exercise of such entity's authorities under this title.
Such regulations shall, to the extent practicable, mirror the provisions
provided for the confidential treatment of financial records under the
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. § 340l). " 164 The
statute referenced in the amendment, 12 U.S.C. § 3401, dictates rules
concerning the protection of consumer financial information in the
supervisory process, not privileged corporate documentation.
The
161.
162.
163.
164.

12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(6)(A) (Supp. IV 2010).
155 Cong. Rec. H14,764, 14,772 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009).
12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(6)(A) (Supp. IV 2010) (emphasis added).
155 Cong. Rec. H14,770 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009) (emphasis added).
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amendment passed a voice vote before it was permanently tabled.165
Unfortunately for the sake of conclusive analysis, there are
colorable arguments for each competing interpretation of this provision.
When arguments balance under Chevron's first step, courts will find the
issue inconclusive or ambiguous.1 66 However in this case, there is more
evidence to help demonstrate congressional intent under Chevron step
one.
Russello Presumptionand CongressionalIntent

B.

1. Russello Presumption
If Congress intended for the CFPB to have selective waiver
protection, it would have provided it within the Dodd-Frank Act.
Instead, Congress provided such protection to other agencies and offices
created in the same bill.'6 7 "[W]here Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. ' ' 6 8 In this case,
Congress's omission is sufficient to demonstrate congressional intent.
2. Russello Presumption and Chevron Step One
The Russello presumption is a valid canon of construction to
demonstrate congressional intent under Chevron step one. The United
States Supreme Court has deployed this rule of construction four times
in the first half of the 2012 calendar year; this shows that the rule is
canonical.1 69 Furthermore, it is often cited to address similar facts to
165.

155 Cong. Rec. H14,776 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009).

166. Finding ambiguity under Chevron step one leads to step two, where most agency
actions are upheld. See PIERCE, supra note 102, at 228 (discussing the low standard
imposed by Chevron step two).
167. 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (Supp. IV 2010); 31 U.S.C. § 313(e)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 2010).

168. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong
Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
169.

See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct, 2566, 2583 (2012)

("Congress's decision to label this exaction a 'penalty' rather than a 'tax' is significant
because the Affordable Care Act describes many other exactions it creates as 'taxes.'
Where Congress uses certain language in one part of a statute and different language in
another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally." (citing Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))); see also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply,
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those presented by the CFPB's privilege rule. Courts regularly deploy
Russello presumptions to reverse agency actions under Chevron step
one. 170

3. Russello Presumption, the Dodd-Frank Act, and Selective Waiver
Protection

Analyzing the Dodd-Frank Act under Russello shows that
Congress did not intend for the CFPB to have selective waiver
protection. Within Dodd-Frank, Congress provided one selective
waiver provision to protect documents provided to FSOC and the Office
of Financial Research. 171 Congress provided another, separate selective
waiver provision to protect documents provided to the Federal
Insurance Office. 172 Congress provided no such provision for the
CFPB.

This is a standard Russello case; these facts support the

conclusion that Congress intentionally omitted a selective waiver
provision covering the CFPB. If Congress did not intend for the CFPB
to be covered with selective waiver protection, the agency may not
promulgate a rule contradicting that intent.

Arguably, the CFPB's

privilege rule should fail under Chevron step one.
4. No Further Evidence of Contrary Congressional Intent
No further

indications

of contrary

congressional

intent

supporting the CFPB appear in this case. Under these circumstances,
courts should hold that congressional intent is clear. Further insistence
of possible ambiguity under Chevron step one would hinder the goal of

giving effect to Congress' will. Justice Thomas identified this problem

LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1851 (2012) (Kennedy J., dissenting); Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP
v. Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. 680, 688 (2012); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 (2012).
170. See, e.g., Garcia-Carias v. Holder, 697 F.3d 257, 264 (5th. Cir. 2012) (citing
Russello v. United States to conclude that the Board of Immigration Appeals's interpretation
fails under Chevron step one); Hanif v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 694 F.3d 479, 486
(3rd Cir. 2012) (citing Russello to conclude that Board of Immigration Appeals'
interpretation fails under Chevron step one); see also Luminant Generation Co., L.L.C. v.
U.S. E.P.A., 675 F.3d 917, 930 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Russello to strike down EPA
requirement under APA "arbitrary and capricious" standard).
171. 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (Supp. IV 2010).
172. 31 U.S.C. § 313(e)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 2010).
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in his dissent in Negusie v. Holder.'73 A willingness to find ambiguity
in any statutory silence "essentially requires Congress either to obey a
judicially imposed clear-statement rule or accept the risk that the courts
may refuse to give full effect to a statute's plain meaning.' 74 Justice
Thomas's concern can be stated as a counterfactual. If Congress
genuinely did intend that the CFPB should not have selective waiver
protection, what could it have written into Dodd-Frank to make that
intent clear to a judge that might not accept the Russello presumption?
Short of including what Justice Thomas calls a "clear statement" (an
explicit statement) to the effect that the CFPB shall not have selective
waiver protection, it is difficult to imagine what more Congress could
do. But it is facially unreasonable to utilize a judicial standard that
obliges Congress to enunciate every precise policy that it does or does
not want. This very impossibility is the justification for the creation of
75
our vast administrative state.1
5. In the Supreme Court, Russello will only be Applied
under Chevron Based on a Precise Comparison.
In terms of Chevron analysis in the Supreme Court, the Russello
17 6
presumption has more commonly been found in dissenting opinions.
While this does call into question the vitality of the rule, this is more
likely an indication that the Court only deploys Russello based on
precise comparisons where congressional intent is most clear.
In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc. 177 the Court was asked to
determine if the EPA's decision to consider regulatory costs and
benefits was permitted under a specific provision of the Clean Water
Act (CWA). The majority found the EPA's interpretation permissible

173. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 550 (2009).
174. Id.
175. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) ("Congress, that is,
may not have expressly delegated authority or responsibility to implement a particular
provision or fill a particular gap. Yet it can still be apparent from the agency's generally
conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the
agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute
or fills a space in the enacted law, even one about which 'Congress did not actually have an
intent' as to a particular result.") (citation omitted).
176. See, e.g., Negusie, 555 U.S. 511, (Thomas, J., dissenting); Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 244 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. 208.
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under Chevron step two. The dissent objected that cost-benefit analysis
under this provision had been considered and rejected when the CWA
was drafted. The dissent also identified other passages that considered
costs and benefits. Citing Russello, the dissent argued that Congress
clearly did not intend for costs and benefits to be considered under this
provision and that the EPA was not permitted to contradict
78
congressional intent.
The Entergy case presents a less precise comparison than the
provisions relevant to the CFPB's privilege rule. The comparison in
Entergy is not precise because the cost-benefit issue being litigated is
too diffuse. 179 Including the standard being litigated, the CWA provides
five different standards that control how the EPA regulates the use of
technology to reduce the environmental impact of power plants and
other facilities.' 80 For the other four standards, Congress provided
statutorily defined factors that the EPA was required to consider - cost
was addressed in different nuanced ways for each standard.' 8' Congress
82
provided no guiding factors for the standard at issue in Entergy.
Construing this silence as an intentional prohibition would be difficult
to interpret and apply because costs and benefits factor into every
discretionary assessment. 83 Therefore, a prohibition would be difficult
to understand and counts against applying Russello in this case.
Additionally, the Entergy Court appeared unwilling to apply

178. It is unclear whether Entergy was a Chevron step one decision. Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, declined to engage in the Chevron step one analysis. Id. at 217-18.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, noted this conspicuous omission and suggested that the majority
did not want to confront the possibility that Congress's silence could demonstrate intent
under step one. Id. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Assuming ambiguity and moving to the
second step reflects the Court's reluctance to consider the possibility, which it later laments
is 'more complex,' that Congress' silence may have meant to foreclose cost-benefit
analysis.") (internal citation omitted). Arguably, Justice Scalia's analysis still conforms to
the requirements of Chevron step one because it found the provision at issue to be
ambiguous. Id. at 220.
179. Id. at 232 (Breyer, J., concurring).
180. Justice Scalia's majority opinion includes an appendix with a table citing and
summarizing these different standards. Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 227 app.
181. Id. at 221 ("The first four of these tests are elucidated by statutory factor lists that
guide their implementation.").
182. Id. at 221 ("There is no such elucidating language applicable to the [standard] at
issue here.").
183. Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 232 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Any such total
prohibition would be difficult to enforce, for every real choice requires a decisionmaker to
weigh advantages against disadvantages, and disadvantages can be seen in terms of (often
quantifiable) costs.").
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Russello because it would require an unreasonable result.' 84 Under
Russello, a partial consideration of costs would be illogical because the
If the EPA were prohibited from
statute is completely silent.
considering costs in any fashion, it could not distinguish between
unfeasibly expensive technologies that provide only mildly better
environmental protection. Indeed, the EPA could not justify refusing to
mandate technologies that would bankrupt entire industries. The Court
found this conclusion untenable.1 85 The Court will not apply Russello to

reach an illogical end, especially not where more reasonable
conclusions are available.
However, the Court has applied Russello in administrative cases
where the statutory evidence supports a precise comparison. In
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc.,' 86 the Court cited Russello to

conclude that the statutory text unambiguously foreclosed an agency
interpretation. 187 The Commissioner of Social Security was tasked with

administering a new pension plan for coal miners that had both public
and private elements. Interpreting the term "successor in interest" and
"related party" the Commissioner assigned 86 miners to the mining
company Jericol. This meant that the company would be responsible

for pension payments to the miners. Jericol objected and brought suit.
The Court rejected the Commissioner's interpretation and held

that successor liability was foreclosed: "Where Congress wanted to
provide for successor liability in the Coal Act, it did so explicitly, as
demonstrated by other sections in the Act that give the option of
attaching liability to 'successors' and 'successors in interest.' ' 188 The
Court cited specific sections providing for successor liability.'8 9

184. Id. at 222 (majority opinion) ("If silence here implies prohibition, then the EPA
could not consider any factors in implementing § 1326(b) - an obvious logical
impossibility."); see also id. at 232 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Moreover, an absolute
prohibition [of considering costs] would bring about irrational results.").
185. Id. at 222 (majority opinion); see also id. at 232 (Breyer, J., concurring).
186. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438 (2002).
187. Arguably, this is not a strict Chevron case. However, the Court applied Chevron
step one and cited Chevron to reach its conclusions that the interpretation was invalid. Id. at
462.
188. Id. at 452-53.
189. 26 U.S.C. § 9706(b)(2) (2006) ("If a person becomes a successor of an assigned
operator after the enactment date, the assigned operator may transfer the assignment of an
eligible beneficiary under subsection (a) to such successor, and such successor shall be
treated as the assigned operator with respect to such eligible beneficiary for purposes of this
chapter."); 26 U.S.C. § 971 l(g)(1) (2006) ("The term 'last signatory operator' shall include
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Barnhart presents clear facts to apply Russello because successor
liability as an issue is discrete and unambiguous. The courts are
eminently capable of determining whether a party is a successor in
interest. Barnhartis directly analogous to the case at hand because the
"retention of privilege" provisions that cover FSOC and other new
offices created by Dodd-Frank are equally as clear as Barnhart's
successor liability provisions.
C.

Selective Omission, Administrative Law, andPolicy

Cases of selective omission strike at the heart of administrative
law's rhetorical posture. The delegation doctrine of administrative law
is premised on the theory that Congress has neither the time nor the
expertise to attend to every policy detail. Congress delegates to
agencies like the CFPB to fill in the gaps. 190 But in this case, Congress
has demonstrated that it had both the time and the expertise to deploy
and enact selective waiver provisions as it saw fit. 191 Thus, it becomes
difficult to explain what gap remains to be filled by the CFPB's
privilege rule.

VII. CONCLUSION
The legislation passed by the lame duck Congress and signed by
the President was necessary to avert a serious risk of civil liability to
major banks and financial institutions. Any entity regulated by the
CFPB was under threat of losing control of its privileged documents and
exposing itself to massive civil actions. While it is possible that the
CFPB's rule would have been upheld, the theory challenging the rule's
validity is clear enough that it could not be ignored.
JACOB M. GERBER
a successor in interest of such operator.").
190. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) ("Congress, that is, may not
have expressly delegated authority or responsibility to implement a particular provision or
fill a particular gap. Yet it can still be apparent from the agency's generally conferred
authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be
able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space
in the enacted law, even one about which 'Congress did not actually have an intent' as to a
particular result.") (citation omitted).
191. 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (Supp. IV 2010); 31 U.S.C. § 313(e)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 2010).

